This paper studies the determinants and channels through which Þscal contractions inßuence the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio and GDP growth. Using data from a panel of OECD countries, the paper shows that the success of Þscal adjustments in decreasing the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the size of the Þscal contraction and less on its composition. The rate of growth of output matters too, but higher GDP growth does not drive the success of a Þscal stabilization. In contrast, whether a Þscal adjustment is expansionary depends largely on the composition of the Þscal manoeuvre. In particular, stabilizations implemented by cutting public spending lead to higher GDP growth rates. The effects of the composition on growth work mostly through the labor market rather than through agents' expectations of future Þscal policy. Finally, the evidence suggests that successful and expansionary Þscal contractions are not the result of accompanying expansionary monetary policy or exchange rate devaluations. * I am very grateful to Alberto Alesina and Fabio Schiantarelli for their suggestions and comments and for their encouragement. I also thank seminar participants at
Introduction
After years of loose Þscal policy in the seventies and early eighties, many OECD countries had to return to Þscal discipline. Consequently, starting from the mid-eighties, several governments undertook austere Þscal programs.
As many recent papers have highlighted, the response of the economy to these Þscal adjustments has varied substantially: in some cases (but not in all) the Þscal tightening led to a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio; in several episodes (but not in all) private consumption, private investment, and GDP growth rates increased during the consolidation and in its immediate aftermath, contrary to the predictions of a standard Keynesian model. 1 This paper studies empirically the determinants of the different outcomes that characterize Þscal adjustment programs in the OECD countries. The paper focuses on the medium-term response of the debt-to-GDP ratio and on GDP growth, and tests the importance of the alternative channels through which tight Þscal policies lead to the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio and to a boom in the economy.
Two non-mutually exclusive explanations have been proposed for successful (i.e. leading to a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio) and expansionary (i.e. leading to a boom in the economy) Þscal stabilizations. One view is related to the impact that current Þscal policy has on the economy through its inßuence on agents' expectations about the stance of the future Þscal policy (the expectation view). This literature predicts that a Þscal contraction can be expansionary if agents perceive that the adjustment signals a change in regime that will lead to the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio and solve the country's Þscal imbalance. For example, the Þscal contraction generates a positive wealth effect and aggregate demand can increase if, in response to an increase in current taxation, agents expect that Þscal policy in the future need not be tighter, or even anticipate a reduction in the tax burden. The other view stresses the effect of the composition of current Þscal policy (whether the deÞcit reduction is achieved through tax increases or through spending cuts) on the economy through the labor market and the cost side of the Þrms (the labor market view). This view suggests that stabilizations that result from cutting public spending, especially transfers and government wage bills, rather than increasing taxes are more likely to be successful and expansionary. They induce a moderation in the wage claims by unions, stimulating employment, capital accumulation, and growth. 2 There is evidence of both channels in the literature, but there has been no attempt to provide an overall 1 See, for example, Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina and Perotti (1995) , Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998), Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and (1996) , and McDermot and Wescott (1996) . 2 See Blanchard (1990) , Bertola and Drazen (1993) , Miller et al. (1990) , and Sutherland (1997) for models that explain expansionary
Þscal contractions through the expectation channel, and Alesina et al. (2002) , Alesina and Perotti (1997) , and Daveri and Tabellini (2000) for contributions that explain expansionary Þscal contractions through the labor market channel.
empirical assessment of their relative importance. One of the goals of this paper is to bridge this gap. The evidence presented here shows that the composition of Þscal policy is a crucial element for growth and that the labor market is an important channel for the transmission of Þscal policy shocks. In fact, controlling for the impact that Þscal policy has on GDP growth through its effect on expectations, the economy booms when government spending and, especially, governments' wage bills are cut, and it slows down when taxes increase.
Also, as the labor market view suggests, there is no evidence that the effect of changes to public spending and taxation on growth is different in periods of large Þscal stabilizations than in other times and that large Þscal contractions per se increase economic activity. Instead, the occurrence of a large Þscal contraction has a positive effect on growth through its effect on agents' expectations about future Þscal policy; however, the variable measuring agents' expectations is statistically signiÞcant only in some speciÞcations. As far as the ability of governments to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio, the size of the Þscal manoeuvre is a key variable. The probability that tight Þscal policies lead to a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio increases the larger the decrease in public spending and the increase in taxes, and it almost doubles when governments engage in large Þscal adjustments.
The paper reaches some additional interesting conclusions. First, current GDP growth does not drive the success of a stabilization. An important criticism of the empirical literature that relates the success of a Þscal manoeuvre to its size and composition is that it does not account for differences in GDP growth rates. Successful Þscal adjustments can result simply from higher GDP growth (due, for example, to other policy measures)
rather than from discretionary Þscal policy choices. The evidence of this paper shows that current GDP growth matters, but that the effects of Þscal policy characteristics on the likelihood of a success do not vanish when one controls for the effect of GDP growth. Second, the paper investigates whether successful and expansionary Þscal adjustments hinge on countries' initial conditions. Obstfeld (1998) , among others, argues that the macroeconomic effects of Þscal adjustments depend on initial conditions, in particular on whether or not Þscal policy is on a sustainable course. The paper shows that the initial level of the debt as a share of GDP has a positive and statistically signiÞcant effect on the probability of a success, but the estimated coefÞcient of the initial level of the deÞcit-to-GDP ratio is negative. However, results do not change if one includes in the sample only country-years with high initial levels of public debt, government deÞcit and primary spending. Finally, the evidence shows that episodes of successful and expansionary Þscal contractions are not simply due to expansionary monetary policy and exchange rate devaluations implemented to offset the Þscal contraction, as some previous research has suggested. In fact, controlling for the stance of monetary policy does not alter the conclusions on the determinants and the channels through which Þscal policy inßuences the economy.
This paper is related to Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina and Perotti (1995) , Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998), and McDermott and Wescott (1996) . However, it differs from these papers along several dimensions. First, it employs a different methodology: the previous papers draw their conclusions on the basis of descriptive statistics on the characteristics of different Þscal adjustments and on their macroeconomic outcomes.
In contrast, this paper relies on an econometric analysis to reach the results described above. Second, this paper is the Þrst to try to assess econometrically the importance of the channels through which Þscal policy induces a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio and an expansion in output. Third, it improves upon Alesina and Ardagna (1998) and on McDermott and Wescott (1996) by addressing the joint endogeneity of the likelihood that governments implement successful Þscal contractions and of GDP growth, and by controlling for the stance of monetary and exchange rate policies around the time of the adjustment. Finally, the paper explicitly accounts for the fact that what matters for economic activity is not only the current discretionary reduction in the deÞcit, but also the resulting expectations about the stance of future Þscal policy. Previous research on the expectation view does not estimate agents' expectations that the adjustment will lead to a sustainable level of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the future; instead, it proxies the effect that current Þscal policy has on agents' expectations about the stance of future Þscal policy with a dummy variable measuring the size of the improvement in the budget.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theories that explain the expansionary Þscal contractions. Section 3 describes the econometric and data issues and illustrates the speciÞcation for the benchmark model. Section 4 discusses the results, and section 5 checks their robustness. The last section concludes.
A review of the literature
The so-called "expectation view" and the "labor market view" suggest two channels of transmission of Þscal policy shocks that help explaining why in some cases, but not in all, Þscal adjustments led to a reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio and to higher GDP growth rates. These two views are not mutually exclusive nor exhaust all possible channels through which Þscal stabilizations can generate an increase in economic activity. However, they have been suggested in the literature as the most important theories to explain expansionary Þscal contractions and there is a difference in emphasis by various authors on which channel matters most. This section brießy summarizes the expectation and labor market views and, then, discusses an additional potential channel for expansionary Þscal contractions.
The expectation view focuses on the demand side and predicts that Þscal stabilizations may be expansionary if agents believe that the Þscal tightening generates a change in regime that "eliminates the need for larger, maybe much more disruptive adjustments in the future" (Blanchard (1990) ). Consider, for example, a country that is running a deÞcit resulting in increasing public debt. To satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint, the government implements at some point in time a debt-stabilization program. Assume that the stabilization consists of increases in taxes and that the deadweight cost of taxation increases with the tax rate. In this scenario, the longer the government waits to stabilize (hence, the higher the tax rate required), the greater the costs and the permanent distortions of the Þscal adjustment. Hence, an increase in current taxation removes the danger of an even sharper and more costly Þscal adjustment in the future, generating a positive wealth effect. This may induce an increase in current private consumption and in aggregate demand. Similarly, a stabilization achieved by cutting public spending can be expansionary if the cut is expected to be permanent and generates a positive wealth effect that outweights the decrease in current disposable income following the fall in public spending. 3 An additional channel trough which current Þscal policy can inßuence the economy via its effect on agents' expectations is the interest rate. If agents believe that the stabilization is credible and avoids a default on government debt, they can ask for a lower premium on government bonds. Private demand components sensitive to the real interest rate can increase if the reduction in the interest rate paid on government bonds leads to a reduction in the real interest rate charged to consumers and Þrms. 4 Let's now turn to the labor market view, which focuses on the supply-side, and let me clarify right away that expectations can play a role in models that emphasize the effect of Þscal policy through the labor market too. However, as discussed below, in these models, the occurrence of expansionary Þscal contractions does not depend on whether or not agents perceive that the Þscal stabilization generates a change in regime that solves the country's Þscal imbalance. It depends, instead, on the composition of Þscal policy shocks through their effects on labor costs of private sector Þrms. Traditionally, the supply-side effects of Þscal policy have been studied in 3 Note that if taxes were lump-sum, and there were no distortions in the economy that prevent inÞnitely lived agents from smoothing their consumption optimally over time, Ricardian equivalence would hold. Also, if agents have a Þnite life and are not altruistic, or if they are liquidity constrained, a increase in current taxation (or a decrease in public spending) may also have large negative effect on private consumption, reducing agents' disposable income. Current private consumption booms only if the positive wealth effect from the increase in taxation (or from the decrease in public spending) is large enough to outweigh the negative one on current disposable income. See Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993) , Miller et al. (1990) , Perotti (1999) , and Sutherland (1997). 4 The decrease in interest rate can also lead to the appreciation of stocks and bonds, increasing agents' Þnancial wealth, and triggering a consumption/investment boom. Moreover, if agents believe that the stabilization eliminates the danger of a default crisis and have quite a substantial share of their wealth in government bonds, they can be willing to consume and invest more, because the adjustment removes the uncertainty about the "availability" of this part of their wealth.
the context of a standard neoclassical model with perfectly competitive labor markets (see, for instance, Baxter and King (1993), Ludvigson (1996) , and Olivei (1999) ). Recently, the literature has shifted the focus to models with imperfect and unionized labor markets that reßect in a more realistic way the labor markets' nature of most OECD countries and deliver predictions more consistent with the empirical evidence from episodes of Þscal stabilizations. Assume an economy with a unionized labor market as, for example, the one in or Maffezzoli (2001) . Consider Þrst a Þscal stabilization implemented by an increase in income taxes or in social security contributions paid by the workers. For a given pre-tax real wage, these policy shocks lower workers'
after-tax real wage and induce unions to ask for an increase in the pre-tax real wage. The equilibrium wage rate increases leading to a reduction of the equilibrium level of employment and of the shadow value of capital, with negative effects on capital accumulation and on growth. Consider, now, a Þscal stabilization that relies on cuts to public spending. A decrease in government employment, in government wages, and in unemployment beneÞts can have positive effects on the economy because it makes the labor market less tight and weakens unions' power. In fact, a decrease in public employment increases the probability of being unemployed. Because public employment represents an alternative to private employment, lower levels of the former or of public wages also decrease the reservation utility of unions' members. Similarly, a decrease in unemployment beneÞts or in transfers increases the cost of being unemployed. Any decrease in these public spending items lowers pressure on the equilibrium wage with positive consequences for the economy. Note that a general equilibrium model with a perfectly competitive labor market, as the one in Finn (1998), also delivers the result that a decrease in public employment increases employment in the private sector and boosts output. Instead, in a standard neoclassical model with perfectly competitive labor markets, predictions on the effect of changes to other spending and revenue items are, in general, sensitive to the persistence of the policy change, to the Þnancing method, and to the elasticity of the individual labor supply. 5 Finally, in section 4, the paper investigates an additional channel through which a Þscal stabilization can lead to an increase in economic activity. If public investment and private investment are substitutes, a Þscal stabilization achieved by cutting public investment leads to an increase in private investment. GDP growth will increase if private investment is more productive than public investment.
Methodology, data, and benchmark speciÞcation
This section describes the methodology applied for the estimation, the data, and the benchmark speciÞcation.
First, the section discusses the single equation approach, which I use to estimate the ability governments have to solve Þscal imbalances. I calculate agents' expectations that the Þscal contraction will lead, within a few years, to the stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Then, I use this variable as a regressor in the GDP growth equation
to provide an overall empirical assessment of the relative importance of the expectation view. The section also presents a simultaneous equations approach, which takes into account a potential problem of simultaneity between governments' ability to solve a Þscal imbalance and GDP growth. Finally, the section discusses the choice of the sample and the data.
Single equation approach

Modelling the probability of a successful stabilizations
The ability/propensity of a government to solve a Þscal imbalance, s * , is a latent variable not directly observed.
The paper assumes, instead, that we observe a discrete variable s. s indicates whether or not governments undertake discretionary cuts in the deÞcit-to-GDP ratio and obtain, within a few years, a reduction in the debt as a share of GDP. There are two reasons one may want to follow this approach. First, the literature on the macroeconomic effects of Þscal adjustments is not concerned with small and continuous changes in the debt as a share of GDP. Rather, it looks at the impact of large and persistent reductions in the public debt-to-GDP ratio that result from discretionary improvements in the budget. Second, as discussed in section 2, whether a Þscal adjustment has a positive effect on the economy may depend on agents' perception that the stabilization leads to a change in the Þscal regime. A small and continuous change in the debt-to-GDP ratio that does not result from any improvement in the budget can hardly be interpreted as a change in Þscal policy regime that eliminates the need for future tightening. Thus, this paper uses a limited dependent variable estimation method and estimates the following probit model for s * as basic speciÞcation: 
and
where i = {1, ...., I } indicates the countries in the sample; t = {1, ...., T } the annual observation; y measures the real per capita GDP growth rate; #G measures the change in the cyclically adjusted primary expenditure as a share of GDP; #T the change in cyclically adjusted tax revenue as a share of GDP; DE F and DE B are the ratios of government deÞcit and public debt to GDP respectively; Le f t, and Centre are dummy variables equal to one if the government in ofÞce is left or centre oriented and zero otherwise; Ma jor is a dummy variable equal to one if a single party has the majority in the Parliament and zero otherwise. From equation (2), we observe a successful Þscal adjustment if s * it > 0. In the basic model, a successful Þscal stabilization (s it = 1) is an episode in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves, and, two years after, the debt-to-GDP ratio is at least three percentage points lower than in the year of the Þscal tightening. 6 Equation (3) describes agents' expectations about s * it and assumes that the variables on the right-hand side of (1) belong to agents' information set at time t.
This assumption is not too far from reality, or, at least, is less implausible than the alternative. Politicians usually discuss and approve the budget for year t during the second half of year t − 1. Sometimes they make additional
Þscal policy changes during year t, but they usually represent a small fraction of the budget. Moreover, Þscal policy variables have been cyclically adjusted following Blanchard (1993) to correct for the automatic changes in their values due to business cycle ßuctuations and to consider only the effect of changes to Þscal policy due to discretionary policy choices. 7 Based on the discussion in section 2, agents' expectations about governments' ability to solve a country's
Þscal imbalance should depend both on the size of the improvement in the primary deÞcit and on the way in which the improvement is obtained. In fact, the larger the cut in the deÞcit, the more people expect that the current Þscal package can stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio and, hence, remove the need for further Þscal tightening in the future, (see Feldstein (1982) ). Moreover, agents can believe that governments that reduce spending, especially the "untouchable" items of the budget (transfers, government wages, public employment), are more serious and committed to solve the Þscal imbalance than governments that increase taxation. They are willing to undertake 6 This deÞnition uses the same threshold value for the reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio as the one in McDermott and Wescott (1996).
Section 5 shows that results are robust to alternative deÞnitions of successful Þscal adjustments. 7 The cyclical correction calculates what the Þscal policy item would have been if the unemployment rate were equal to that of the benchmark year. The discretionary change of the Þscal policy variable is the difference between the cyclically adjusted variable and the value of the variable in the previous year. See Alesina and Perotti (1995) for a detailed description of the method and for a discussion about its advantages over the methods used by the OECD and the IMF. unpopular policy measures, which, most likely, will have more permanent effects on the budget. This suggests that we should observe a 11 < 0: for given changes in taxes, larger cuts in government spending increase the probability of a success implying both a tighter Þscal policy and a Þscal policy composition based on spending cuts. Instead, the sign of a 12 (the coefÞcient of tax variable) is in theory ambiguous. Suppose, in fact, that the change in the primary balance is the only characteristic of Þscal policy that matters for governments' ability to obtain a reduction in the debt-to GDP ratio. In this case, the higher the increase in taxation, the higher the probability that the debt-to-GDP ratio decreases. Hence, a 12 > 0. If, instead, the composition of the Þscal manoeuvre, but not the size, matters, then, for given changes in government spending, larger increases in taxes should have a negative effect on s * .
To determine whether the size and/or the composition of Þscal policy affect governments' ability to solve countries' Þscal imbalances and test the relative importance of these two characteristics of Þscal stabilizations, the following restrictions on the coefÞcients estimated in equation (1) can be tested: (i) H 0 : a 11 + a 12 = 0; (ii) H 0 :
It investigates whether Þscal policy composition has no effect on s * , and, hence, whether the change in the primary balance is the only characteristic of Þscal policy that can affect governments' ability to implement a successful Þscal contraction. SpeciÞcally, if the data reject H 0 , governments' ability to solve countries Þscal imbalances will also depend on the composition of the Þscal manoeuvre. Assume, instead, that the data do not reject H 0 . In this case, a 11 = −a 12 , which suggests that the only variable that matters is the change in the primary balance. Consider now (ii). If the data do not reject H 0 , then a 11 = a 12 , implying that the composition of the Þscal manoeuvre is the only variable that is important. If, instead, the data reject H 0 , the size of the change in the primary deÞcit will also affect s * . Alternatively, one can investigate the relative importance of the size and the composition of the Þscal manoeuvre by reparametrizing equation (1) as follows:
In equation (4) The benchmark model also controls for countries' initial conditions (the initial level of the deÞcit and debt to GDP ratios, and the lagged GDP growth rate), political variables describing the type and the ideology of the government in ofÞce, and country Þxed effects. The statistical evidence on episodes of Þscal adjustments suggests that successful stabilizations are more likely to occur in "bad" rather than in "good" times. For example, Obstfeld (1998) argues that a deterioration of the Þscal position makes it "easier" for the government in ofÞce to undertake reforms that can lead to a successful stabilization. 8 Sutherland (1997) suggests that, at higher levels of debt, Þscal adjustments are more likely to increase economic activity. This can ease the reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio, increasing the denominator of the ratio. Political characteristics of the government in ofÞce can also play a role beyond their effect on the size and composition of Þscal policy. For example, agents might believe that left-wing governments have more chances to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio than right-wing ones. Because of the left's support from unions and from pensioners, they can communicate the need for the adjustment and stick to their policy in the future more easily. 9 Similarly, agents might think that single-party majority governments are less likely to abandon the program in the future than are coalition or minority cabinets.
GDP growth
Equation (5) describes the real per capita GDP growth regression:
where: s e it is generated using equation (3) and the estimates from equation (1); y, s e , #G, #T , DE F, and DE B are deÞned as in section 3.1.1, and y G7 measures the weighted average (with GDP weights) real per capita GDP growth rate of the G7 countries. Equation (5) is estimated by OLS. However, since it includes a generated regressor, s e it , the conventional standard errors of the coefÞcients are not consistent (unless γ 2 is statistically insigniÞcant). 10 I correct the standard errors following Murphy and Topel (1985) . The correction allows u 1it and u 2it to be correlated.
A positive and statistically signiÞcant coefÞcient of the variable measuring agents' expectations (i.e.: γ 2 )
shows evidence in favor of the expectation view. The more agents perceive that the government is able to solve the Þscal imbalance, the more they expect that future Þscal policy does not need to be as tight as current Þscal policy, and both private current consumption and investment can increase, leading to higher GDP growth. As for effect of changes to primary spending and government revenues on GDP growth, once we control for the expectation channel including s e among the regressors in (5), #G and #T can affect the macroeconomy through the other channels discussed in section 2 or through the standard Keynesian channel. Decreases in taxes have a positive effect on the economy both according to the labor market view and in a standard Keynesian model. Decreases in public spending have negative effect on growth in a Keynesian model. Instead, according to the labor market view decreases to government spending and, especially to the government wage bill and welfare payments, boost growth. Similarly, decreases in public investment can lead to higher private investment and growth if public investment is a substitute for private investment and the former is less productive than the latter. Hence, we can interpret a 21 < 0 as evidence in favor of the labor market view, particularly if the spending variables that change are public employment, wages of government employees and transfers. If, instead, the change in total government spending is mainly due to changes to public investment, then, a negative value of a 21 can be evidence of the crowding-in effect of private investment following the cut to government investment. Table 3 investigates the effect of changes of single spending components (government wage bill, public employment, an government investment) on GDP growth to provide more evidence on the channels through which changes to Þscal policy can inßuence the economy beyond the expectation channel.
Following the empirical strategy in section 3.1.1, the paper uses the estimates of the coefÞcients a 21 and a 22 in equation (5) to run hypothesis tests similar to (i) -(ii) above and evaluate the relative importance of the size versus the composition of the Þscal manoeuvre in explaining expansionary Þscal adjustments. The paper also reparametrizes equation (5) as:
and captures the effect of the size and the composition with the coefÞcients b 21 
Simultaneous equations approach
The single equation approach assumes that GDP growth inßuences governments' ability to solve a Þscal imbalance only with a lag. If, instead, s * depends also on current GDP growth, then, there is a problem of simultaneity in the procedure described in section 3.1. In fact, if s * and y are endogenous, estimates of the effects of s e on GDP growth without controlling for the effect of current growth on s * are biased. To address this issue, I
also estimate the equation describing governments' ability to solve countries Þscal imbalances and the growth equation simultaneously. The basic model is described by equations (7) and (8): estimate equations (7) and (8) applying Amemiya's (1978) generalized least square technique (AGLS). Newey (1987) shows that AGLS is asymptotically equivalent to the minimum χ 2 estimation procedure, and that, in overidentiÞed systems, AGLS is efÞcient relative to 2IV estimators. 12 To estimate (7) and (8), the system needs to be identiÞed. The identiÞcation of the system requires that at least one exogenous variable in the equation for s * is not included in the equation for growth and vice-versa. In the benchmark model, political variables do not enter the growth equation directly. The literature on political business cycles shows that the type and the ideology of the government in ofÞce affect Þscal policy variables. 11 The speciÞcation assumes that agents know current growth when they form their expectations on governments' ability to stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio. Alternatively, one can argue that agents do not know the contemporaneous growth rate but they use the forecast data on GDP growth. In this case, one introduces a forecast error in (8) . The estimates are still consistent because the estimation method allows for cross-equations correlation between the errors in (7) and (8) . 12 See Appendix B of the working paper version of this paper (Wellesley College working paper 2002-08, July 2002), and Amemiya (1978), Newey (1987) , and Londregan and Poole (1990) for details on the AGLS estimation procedure.
Through the latter, political variables can inßuence the macroeconomy. Moreover, section 3.1 argues that political characteristics of the government in ofÞce can also affect agents' expectations. Because the rhs of equation (8) already includes both Þscal policy variables and the variable capturing agents' expectations, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that Le f t, Centre, and Ma jor do not inßuence GDP growth directly. The identiÞcation of the system also assumes that the lagged real per capita GDP growth rate and the lagged real per capita GDPweighted growth rate of the G7 countries inßuence governments' ability to stabilize successfully only indirectly, through their effect on current GDP growth. The AGLS technique allows easily to test the overidentifying restrictions of the system and the empirical analysis will show that the model does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at conventional conÞdence levels.
Sample choice and data
What is the more appropriate sample of country-years one should consider to estimate the determinants of the different outcomes of Þscal adjustments in the OECD countries? This papers argues that the sample should include country-years in which there is a "need" for Þscal austerity. Most of the empirical literature on Þscal adjustments has, instead, considered only country-years in which there is evidence of large discretionary Þscal policy tightening. On the one hand, including in the sample also country-years in which there is no concern for the state of public Þnance and no need for Þscal austerity can bias the estimate of the coefÞcient γ 2 downward. In such circumstances, agents' expectations about governments' ability to solve a Þscal imbalance play no role and if we include these observations in the sample, we cannot distinguish cases in which we do not observe a successful stabilization because there is no need for it from cases in which a stabilization is needed but governments are not able to carry one out. On the contrary, information from country-years in which Þscal discipline is a problem, but governments do not undertake discretionary and substantial deÞcit cuts, is valuable to consumers and investors. 
Empirical results
Basic speciÞcations
Columns 1 -4 of Table 1 in taxes raises the probability of a success from 0.19 to 0.30. 14 These effects are statistically signiÞcant at the 5% level. Second, the success of a Þscal adjustment depends on the size of the Þscal contraction and less on its composition. In fact, the data strongly reject the null hypothesis that the composition of Þscal policy is the only characteristic of the manoeuvre that is important (H 0 : a 11 − a 12 = 0), while they reject only at the 10% level the null hypothesis that the change of the primary balance is the only variable that counts for s * (H 0 : countries in which s does not vary over time. In Germany, the data do not show any episode of successful Þscal adjustment when the latter is deÞned as in section 3.1.1 or in section 5. 14 To calculate the effect of a 1% change in a continuous variable on s * , I consider the difference between the average probability of success using the estimated coefÞcients and the data in the sample and the value of this same variable calculated assuming that the continuous variable is 1% higher (or lower) than in the actual data. The effect of a change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1 is measured as the difference between the average probability calculated if the dummy variable is equal to zero and the average probability calculated if the dummy variable is equal to one. I evaluate the average probability of success using the estimated coefÞcients and the data in the sample. I adopt this method throughout the paper. Alternatively, I could have measured the probability evaluating it at the average value of the explanatory variables. suggest that the composition of Þscal policy is the only characteristic that matters for growth, while the change in the primary balance-to-GDP ratio has no effect. In fact, the null hypothesis H 0 : a 21 − a 22 = 0 cannot be rejected, while the null hypothesis H 0 : a 21 + a 22 = 0 is rejected by the data. Results (not shown but available upon request) of the estimation of the reparametrized model in equation (6) conÞrm the tests' results. Including the regressor that measures the effect of the change in the primary balance, (#G −#T ), and the one that captures the effect of the composition, (#G + #T ), the coefÞcient of the former is not statistically signiÞcant, while the one of the latter is signiÞcant at the 5% level. Finally, note that agents' expectations about governments' ability to solve countries' Þscal imbalances do not have a statistically signiÞcant effect on GDP growth.
To further investigate the impact that Þscal policy characteristics have on GDP growth through their effects on expectations, I estimate equation (6) Table 1 . This suggests that the negative and statistically signiÞcant effect that government spending has on GDP growth is not due to a potential endogeneity problem between #G and y that could, for example, occurr if the cyclical adjstment method used were not perfect or if the government decided and implemented during a given year, after the approval of the budget, large additional Þscal policy measures.
Results from the simultaneous equations approach are in columns 5 -8. They are very similar to the ones obtained in the single equation approach. The effect of current real GDP growth on s * is larger than that of past economic growth. The probability that governments are able to solve a Þscal imbalance increases by 6
percentage points from 0.20 to 0.26 when real GDP growth is one percentage point higher. Previous studies have been criticized because they failed to take into account the feedback effects from GDP growth on the likelihood of a successful stabilization. Columns 5 and 7 show that the coefÞcient of current growth is signiÞcant but high economic growth does not drive the success of a consolidation. In fact, controlling for current growth, Þscal policy variables have the same effect on s * than in columns 1 and 3, except for the variable measuring the effect of the composition of the Þscal manoeuvre which is now statistically signiÞcant at the 5% level. Note, also, that the χ 2 tests of the overidentifying restrictions do not reject the estimated models at least at the 10% conÞdence level.
In summary, i) the probability that tight Þscal policies lead to a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio depends on the size of the improvement in the primary balance and less on its composition; ii) higher GDP growth favors the success of a Þscal contraction but it is not the only important determinant of governments' ability to solve countries' Þscal imbalances; iii) controlling for the impact that Þscal policy characteristics have on GDP growth through their effects on expectations, the paper Þnds that GDP growth is higher the larger the decrease in public spending. There is no evidence that the change in the primary balance per se affects economic activity. Instead, the size of a Þscal contraction has a positive effect on growth through its effect on agents' expectations about future Þscal policy. In fact, in some speciÞcations, agents' beliefs about governments' ability to solve a Þscal imbalance have a positive effect on growth.
Non-linear effects of changes in Þscal policy
According to the expectation view, not only the improvement in the primary balance and the way in which the improvement is obtained can have a positive effect on s * and s e , but the effects of changes to Þscal policy variables can be nonlinear. For example, agents can believe that the stabilization will be successful only if the reduction in the primary deÞcit is substantial. To the contrary, the labor market view does not suggest that there is any difference in the reaction of the economy to small versus large Þscal adjustments or to Þscal adjustments versus Þscal expansions. In fact, both a Þscal stabilization implemented by a decrease in public spending and a Þscal expansion that relies on cuts to labor taxes can generate an increase in economic activity. To provide evidence on the relative importance of the expectation versus the labor market channel, I now investigate whether the response of s * and/or y to Þscal policy shocks is non-linear. I begin by adding to the equations estimated in Table 1 , columns 5 -8, the square of the variables #G and #T (Table 2 columns 1 and 2) , and of (#G −#T ) and (#G +#T ) ( Table 2 ST AB and #G and #T are opposite to the one of #G and #T . Ceteris paribus, during periods of large Þscal adjustments (i.e. when ST AB = 1), the likelihood of a success is higher, while the effect of a one percentage point increase in taxation is lower than in normal times (i.e. when ST AB = 0) and the effect on s * of a one percentage point cut to government spending is not statistically signiÞcant (the data do not reject the linear restriction that the sum of the coefÞcient of #G and #G(ST AB) is zero). Overall, however, the size of the adjustment matters for its success: computing the average probability of governments' ability to solve a Þscal imbalance when ST AB = 0 and when ST AB = 1, the probability of a success jumps from 0.21 to 0.35 (using the coefÞcients in column 5) or to 0.30 (using the coefÞcients in column 7). As for the results of the GDP 15 Theoretically, there is no reason why the probability that the government is able to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio should respond in a non-linear fashion to large improvements in the balance, but not to large deteriorations. Empirically, however, we cannot test this assumption using the model described in section 3. Suppose we introduce among the regressors of the equation for s * a dummy variable similar in spirit to ST AB but equal to one if the cyclically adjusted primary balance deteriorates by no less than a certain percent and zero otherwise. The latter variable perfectly predicts some observations, because, by deÞnition, the variable s is always equal to zero when the primary balance deteriorates. Hence, we cannot estimate the coefÞcient of a dummy variable that measures large deteriorations in the budget in our probit model. In order to avoid this technical problem, one could deÞne the dependent variable considering only the value of the debt-to-GDP ratio in future years, without imposing any constraint on the change in the primary balance in year t. However, as discussed at the beginning of section 3, it is hard to interpret a change in the debt-to-GDP ratio that does not result from any discretionary improvement in the budget as a change in Þscal policy regime. Hence, this choice does not seem sensible for the purpose of this paper. Moreover, this paper follows the literature focusing on large Þscal contractions, rather than on large Þscal expansions. The working paper version of this paper also estimates, in the single equation approach, a speciÞcation including a variable that measures the effect of large deteriorations in the primary balance in the equation for GDP growth. I Þnd no evidence that the occurrence of a large deterioration in the primary balance affects GDP growth.
growth regressions (columns 6 and 8), there is no evidence that the direct effect of Þscal policy shocks on growth is different in periods of large Þscal stabilizations than in other times and that large Þscal contractions per se increase economic activity. The coefÞcient of the variable ST AB and those of the interaction terms between ST AB and the Þscal policy variables are not statistically signiÞcant. At best, in the speciÞcation in which the coefÞcient of s e is signiÞcant, the occurrence of a large Þscal contraction has a positive effect on economic activity only through its effect on agents' expectations about future Þscal policy (see, for example, columns 7 and 8 of Table 2 ). 16 These results are largely consistent with the predictions of the labor market view and with the evidence in Alesina et al. (2002) on investment. Table 3 investigates the effect of changes to the government wage bill (#CW ), public employment (#EG), and labor taxes (#L ABT ) to provide more evidence on the effect of Þscal policy through the labor market. The labor market view, in fact, suggests that these components of the budget are particularly important for economic activity through their effect on private sector's labor costs. Moreover, Table 3 also estimates a speciÞcation that includes the change to government investment (#I G) among the explanatory variables of the estimated equations to investigate whether the positive effect of a decrease in public spending on growth shown in Table 1 is due to a crowding-in effect that a decrease in public investment can have on private investment.
Effects of changes to selected items of the government budget
The speciÞcation in Table 3 builds on the results in Table 1 #L ABT , and #I G in both equations to check through which channels changes to Þscal policy affect growth beyond the expectation channel. Controlling for expectations, changes in the government wage bill, public employment and labor taxes have a negative and statistical signiÞcant effect on GDP growth, while changes in government investment are not statistically signiÞcant for GDP growth. These results are consistent with the predictions of the labor market view and the statistical evidence on Þscal stabilizations, which shows that episodes that relied mainly on decreases in public investment were not associated with a boom in economic activity while episodes based on large cuts to the government wage bill and welfare payments were accompanied 16 If we include the dummy variable ST AB among the regressors of Table 2 columns 5-8, but not the interaction terms between ST AB and the Þscal policy variables, results are virtually identical to those in Table 1 by an economic expansion (see, for example, Alesina and Ardagna (1998)).
The role of the policy mix
Fiscal stabilizations rarely happen in isolation; they are often part of broader policy packages. Even in a standard IS-LM model, a Þscal contraction that is accompanied by an expansionary monetary policy can lead to a boom in the economy. The speciÞcations in Tables 1 -3 do not control for the stance of monetary policy. Suppose, for example, that the Þscal tightening is accompanied by a lax policy, or that exchange rate devaluations systematically anticipate the Þscal adjustments that turn out to be successful and expansionary. In this case, the coefÞcients of Þscal policy variables can be biased capturing the effect of monetary rather than Þscal policy.
Previous research has been aware of this problem, but has failed to address it. This paper explicitly controls for the stance of monetary and exchange rate policies providing a further check that the conclusions reached so far are sound. I reestimate the models of Tables 3 including as regressors in the GDP growth equation lagged values of the rate of growth of M2, of the change in the short-term nominal interest rate, and of the rate of growth of the nominal exchange rate. 17 As an example, Table 4 shows the speciÞcations augmented with the rate of growth of the nominal exchange rate. Results for the other speciÞcations are available upon request. While an increase in money growth and a decrease in the short-term nominal interest rate increase GDP growth, there is no robust evidence that changes in the nominal exchange rate have a statistical signiÞcant effect on economic activity. There is mixed evidence in the literature on the link between Þscal consolidations and exchange rate devaluations as well.
Some studies present evidence that stronger devaluations anticipate some expansionary Þscal adjustments, some
Þnd the opposite result. 18 This paper is not concerned with whether or not monetary policy affects the economy.
What matters here is that the coefÞcients of Þscal policy variables do not capture the impact of monetary rather than Þscal policy. Indeed, the coefÞcients of Þscal policy variables and of s e and the t-statistics in Table 4 are very similar to those in Table 3. 17 Data availability and comparability across countries constraints the choice of the indicators of the monetary policy's stance. 18 Bradley and Whelan (1997), for example, claim that the increase in export due to the devaluation of the nominal exchange rate determined 
Sensitivity analysis
This sections summarizes several robustness checks. Results (not shown and available upon request) support the conclusions discussed in section 4.
First, results are robust to alternative speciÞcations of the sample of country-years in which there is need for Þscal austerity. I estimate columns 7 and 8 of Table 1 using the following rules. First, I include in the sample only the observations for which the debt-to-GDP ratio lagged one year is greater than the average value in the country. Second, I select all those observations for which the primary spending-to-GDP ratio lagged one year is greater than the average value in the country. Finally, I consider all the observations for which the deÞcit as a share of GDP lagged one year is greater than the average value in the country. Compared with the estimates in Table 1 , real GDP growth is not statistically signiÞcant in the equation for s * when countries are selected on the basis of debt and deÞcit's levels. The effects of agents' expectations about governments' ability to solve a Þscal imbalance and those of Þscal policy characteristics are very similar to results in Table 1 .
Second, different deÞnitions of the variable measuring governments' ability to solve countries' Þscal imbalances do not alter results shown so far. First, I deÞne a successful Þscal stabilization as an episode in which the cyclical adjusted primary balance improves and, two year after, the debt-to-GDP ratio is at least 1.5 percentage points lower than in the year of the Þscal tightening. Second, to lose fewer observations at the end of the sample, I
look at a shorter horizon. SpeciÞcally, I require that the debt-to-GDP ratio declines by at least 1 percentage point one year after the Þscal contraction. Finally, I deÞne a successful stabilization looking not only at the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio but also at the dynamics of the deÞcit. Thus, I deÞne a successful stabilization as an episode in which the cyclical adjusted primary balance improves and, two years after, either the debt-to-GDP ratio is 3 percentage point lower or the deÞcit as a share of GDP is 1.5 percentage points lower than in the year of the Þscal tightening. The only difference relatively to the estimates in Table 1 is that real GDP growth is not statistically signiÞcant in the equation for s * when the second deÞnition is used. 
Conclusions
This paper evaluates the determinants of the different macroeconomic outcomes observed during and a few years after many episodes of Þscal consolidations in the OECD countries. The evidence suggests that the probability that tight Þscal policies lead to a decrease in the debt-to-GDP ratio increases the larger the cut in the deÞcit. As for the effect of changes to Þscal policy on GDP growth, the paper Þnds that the composition of Þscal policy is a crucial element for growth and that the labor market is an important channel for the transmission of Þscal policy shocks. In fact, controlling for the impact that Þscal policy changes have on GDP growth through their effects on expectations, GDP growth is higher the larger the decrease of public spending, and especially of the government wage bill. Agents' expectations about governments' ability to solve countries' Þscal imbalances are, instead, statistically signiÞcant only in some speciÞcations of the growth equation. Hence, the evidence on the effect of Þscal policy on economic activity through this channel is mixed. Finally, the paper shows that successful and expansionary Þscal contractions are not the result of expansionary monetary policies or of exchange rate devaluations. The paper does not address some interesting issues such as the behavior of interest rates and
Þnancial markets around the time of the Þscal adjustments and the interaction between Þscal policies, income policies, structural reforms of the labor market, and privatizations. These topics deserve further investigation.
in the group of countries with an intermediate degree of centralization; Canada, the United States, Japan, Italy, United Kingdom, France, and Australia in the group of the decentralized countries. Greece, Ireland and Spain are not classiÞed in Alesina and Perotti (1997) and are in as a separate group in this paper.
A Data Appendix
Economic • Debt = government gross debt.
• Primary expenditure = transfers+government consumption + public investment + subsidies.
• Government wages = wage government consumption.
• Revenue = direct taxes on households+direct taxes on business+indirect taxes+social security contributions received by the government+other current transfers received by the government.
• Labor taxes = direct taxes on households + social security contributions.
• Tran* = cyclically adjusted transfer as a share of GDP as in Alesina and Perotti (1995) .
• Rev* = cyclically adjusted revenue as a share of GDP as in Alesina and Perotti (1995) .
• Primary cyclically adjusted balance/GDP = (Tran*)+((government consumption+public investment+subsidies-government consumption of Þxed capital-net capital transfers received by the government 20 )/GDP)-(Rev*).
After 1970, other payments made and received by the governments, (variables YPEPG and YPERG) are also considered in the deÞnition of the primary deÞcit and interest payments are excluded.
• #G = change in cyclically adjusted primary spending as a share of GDP.
• #T = change in cyclically adjusted government revenue as a share of GDP.
• #EG = percentage change in public employment as a share of total employment.
• #CW = change in government wage bill as a share of GDP.
• #L ABT = change in cyclically adjusted labor taxes' revenue as a share of GDP. 20 In each year, the following data are missing: a) government consumption of Þxed capital (Cfgk) for France, United Kingdom and Portugal; b) net capital transfer received by the government (Ktrrg) for Norway; c) government consumption of Þxed capital and net capital transfer received by the government for Greece. For these countries, the variables corresponding to the missing data are not included in the equation for the primary cyclically adjusted deÞcit.
• ST AB = 1 if the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves by at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP relative to the previous year and zero otherwise.
• Growth = growth rate of real per capita GDP.
• Growth (G7) = average growth rate of real per capita GDP (with GDP weights) of the seven major industrial countries.
• #E XC H = rate of change of the nominal effective exchange rate. A minus sign corresponds to a devaluation of the currency.
• %#M2 = rate of growth of M2.
• I nterest rate = Short term interest rate.
• #I nterest rate = Short term interest rate (t) -Short term interest rate (t-1).
• Majority = 1 if the government in ofÞce during the year is a majoritarian government. The classiÞcation is from Budge, Keman and Woldendrop (1993). If there are changes of government during the year, the type of the government is determined by the government in ofÞce for the highest number of months.
• Left = 1 if the government in ofÞce during the year is a left government. The classiÞcation is from Budge, Keman and Woldendrop (1993). If there are changes of government during the year, the type of the government is determined by the government in ofÞce for the highest number of months.
• Centre= 1 if the government in ofÞce during the year is a centre government. The classiÞcation is from Budge, Keman and Woldendrop (1993) . If there are changes of government during the year, the type of the government is determined by the government in ofÞce for the highest number of months. . ∆G = change in cyclically adjusted primary spending as a share of GDP. ∆T = change in cyclically adjusted government revenue as a share of GDP. STAB = 1 if the cyclically adjusted primary balance improves by at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP relative to the previous year and zero otherwise. Other regressors included in columns 1, 3, 5, 7 are: Deficit/GDP (t-1), Debt/GDP(t-1), Left, Centre, Majority. Other regressors included in columns 2, 4, 5, 8 are: Deficit/GDP (t-1), Debt/GDP(t-1), Growth (t-1), Growth G7 (t-1). See also the Data Appendix. Country fixed effects are included in all columns. t-statistics in parenthesis. . ∆G = change in cyclically adjusted primary spending as a share of GDP. ∆T = change in cyclically adjusted government revenue as a share of GDP. ∆EG = percentage change in public employment. ∆CW = change in government wage bill as a share of GDP. ∆LABT = change in cyclically adjusted labor taxes' revenue as a share of GDP. Growth G7 = average real per capita GDP growth of the G7 countries. Deficit/GDP = government deficit as a share of GDP. Debt/GDP = public debt as a share of GDP. Left = 1 if government in office is left oriented, and zero otherwise. Centre = 1 if government in office is center oriented, and zero otherwise. Majority = 1 if a single party has the majority in the Parliament, and zero otherwise. See also the Data Appendix. Country fixed effects are included. t-statistics in parenthesis. . ∆G = change in cyclically adjusted primary spending as a share of GDP. ∆T = change in cyclically adjusted government revenue as a share of GDP. ∆EG = percentage change in public employment. ∆CW = change in government wage bill as a share of GDP. ∆LABT = change in cyclically adjusted labor taxes' revenue as a share of GDP. Growth G7 = average real per capita GDP growth of the G7 countries. Deficit/GDP = government deficit as a share of GDP. Debt/GDP = public debt as a share of GDP. Left = 1 if government in office is left oriented, and zero otherwise. Centre = 1 if government in office is center oriented, and zero otherwise. Majority = 1 if a single party has the majority in the Parliament, and zero otherwise. ∆EXCH = percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate (a minus sign indicates a nominal devaluation). See also the Data Appendix. Country fixed effects are included. tstatistics in parenthesis.
